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On 30 October 2019, the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
made public its decision in the case of López Albán v. Spain. The case concerned a 
single mother with six children occupying a vacant apartment owned by a financial 
entity out of necessity, after being excluded from the possibility of obtaining public 
housing. The family was eventually evicted without adequate alternative 
accommodation. The Committee found that this eviction violated the right to 
adequate housing enshrined in the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights. This article summarises the case, provides a contextual analysis in 
light of recent developments, makes a comparison with the case law of 
the European Court of Human Rights, and notes some legal avenues the Committee 
could explore in future decisions. 
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Le Comité des droits économiques, sociaux et culturels a publié sa décision dans 
l’affaire López Albán c. Espagne le 30 octobre 2019. Il s’agit d’une affaire où une 
mère célibataire avec six enfants occupait un appartement vide propriété d’un 
établissement financier par nécessité, après avoir été exclue de la possibilité 
d’obtenir un logement public. La famille fût finalement expulsée, sans une 
alternative de relogement adéquate. Le Comité a trouvé que cette expulsion a 
constitué une violation du Pacte international relatif aux droits économiques, 
sociaux et culturels. Cet article présente un sommaire de l’affaire, offre une analyse 
contextuelle à la lumière de certains développements récents, fait une comparaison 
avec la jurisprudence de la Cour européenne des droits de l’homme, et remarque 
quelques avenues juridiques que le Comité pourrait explorer dans ses décisions à 
venir. 
 
MOTS-CLÉS: Comité DESC, droit au logement, expulsions locatives, contrôle de 
proportionnalité, Espagne.  
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On 30 October 2019, the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(CESCR) made public its decision in the case of López Albán v. Spain.1 The case 
concerned a single mother with six children occupying a vacant apartment owned by a 
financial entity out of necessity, after being excluded from the possibility of obtaining 
public housing. The family was eventually evicted without adequate alternative 
accommodation. In one of the emergency shelters they stayed at, two of the minor 
children were separated from their mother and siblings. 
                                                 
1 United Nations, Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Communication no. 37/2018, López 
Albán, E/C.12/66/D/37/2018 (11 October 2019). At the time of writing, the decision is only available in 
Spanish. All translations in this article are the author’s and all errors remain my own. I would like to thank 
Javier Rubio and the Asamblea de Vivienda de Carabanchel for their excellent work on this case. 




The CESCR found that Spain had violated the right to housing of the applicant and her 
children, since their eviction had been carried out without ensuring adequate alternative 
accommodation and without a prior proportionality assessment. Spain also violated their 
right to housing insofar as the author was excluded from public housing on the grounds 
that she had been occupying a dwelling without a legal title. 
 
2. The facts. 
Maribel Viviana López Albán lived with her six children in an apartment in Madrid. After 
paying rent regularly for a year, she found out that the alleged landlord was a fraudster 
and that he did not actually own the apartment, so she stopped making payments to him. 
Later that year, the financial entity who actually owned the apartment reported her for 
illegal occupation. Following criminal proceedings, the Madrid Criminal Court found her 
guilty of a crime of trespassing (usurpación), finding a partial extenuating circumstance 
since the family income at that time was very low and this did not allow them to subsist.2 
 
The Court ruled however that, although the family’s situation was one of severe necessity, 
they were not destitute, nor was it impossible for the author to solve their situation by 
other lawful means. A complete exonerating circumstance was thus not found in this case. 
The author appealed this judgment, but the Court of Appeals confirmed the ruling of the 
lower court. The author subsequently tried to negotiate with the financial entity to sign a 
rental contract with them, to no avail. 
 
While staying at this apartment, the author had applied for public housing to the 
authorities of the Madrid Autonomous Community, but her application was rejected on 
the basis that she was occupying a dwelling without a legal title. This constitutes grounds 
for exclusion according to the applicable legal norm: applicants must not “be occupying 
a property or dwelling without sufficient legal title and without the owner’s consent.”3 
Even though she was placed in an emergency housing programme, these units are 
allocated as a matter of priority, and she was still on the waiting list at the time that a 
court order was made for her eviction. 
 
After a first eviction attempt halted by housing activists and civil society organisations, a 
second attempt was carried out, and the family then decided to voluntarily leave the 
apartment. Social services offered them a stay at a hostel in an industrial area for a few 
nights, after which the family had to move to a different hostel where they shared bunk 
beds with another family. The family was then placed in a third hostel in two separate 
                                                 
2 The crime of usurpación takes places when someone occupies a property, dwelling, or building without 
due authorisation or when they remain there against the will of its owner. See Spain, Ley Orgánica 10/1995, 
de 23 de noviembre, del Código Penal (BOE núm. 281, de 24 de noviembre de 1995), art. 245.2. 
3 See Spain, Autonomous Community of Madrid, Decreto 52/2016, de 31 de mayo, del Consejo de 
Gobierno, por el que se crea el Parque de Viviendas de Emergencia Social y se regula el proceso de 
adjudicación de viviendas de la Agencia de Vivienda Social de la Comunidad de Madrid (BOCM núm. 
261, de 31 de octubre de 2016), art. 14.1.f.  
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rooms segregated by sex, with the consequence that the two male seven-year old twins 
had to sleep on their own, separated from their mother and sisters. 
 
The author brought a complaint before the CESCR claiming that her eviction violated her 
right to housing and that of her children under Article 11 ICESCR, since it was carried 
out without securing adequate alternative accommodation for them. She also argued that 
the relevant authorities did not provide her with public housing because she was 
occupying an apartment without a legal title at the time, requirement which puts her in an 
impossible situation and breaches her right to housing. 
 
Since the eviction had already taken place at that time, the CESCR requested Spain to 
adopt interim measures consisting on immediately providing the family with adequate 
and stable alternative accommodation, in the framework of a genuine and effective 
consultation with the author to prevent eventual irreparable risks to her and her children. 
The author claimed that Spain had not complied with this request and had thus breached 
the Optional Protocol to the ICESCR, which refers to the CESCR’s power to request, at 
any time after the receipt of a communication and before a determination on the merits 
has been reached, “that the State Party take such interim measures as may be necessary 
in exceptional circumstances to avoid possible irreparable damage to the victim or victims 
of the alleged violations.”4 
 
3. The CESCR decision. 
The Committee started by recalling the duty of the state to provide adequate alternative 
accommodation in cases of need and the safeguards afforded by the ICESCR against 
forced evictions, building on its General Comment No. 4,5 its General Comment No. 7,6 
and its decision in the case of Ben Djazia and Bellili.7 These considerations apply as well 
to occupations without a legal title, since “this occupation can become, for certain people, 
a form of housing, so this could come within the scope of protection of the right to 
housing.”8  
 
Even when evictions are justified, for instance in the case of a persistent nonpayment of 
rent or in the case of damages to the rented property without a reasonable cause, the 
procedures conducive to an eviction and the eviction itself must be compatible with the 
ICESCR and must guarantee that all appropriate legal remedies are available to the 
persons affected.9 Authorities must ensure that forced evictions are carried out according 
                                                 
4 United Nations, General Assembly, Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights, A/RES/63/117 (10 December 2008), art. 5. 
5 United Nations, Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment no. 4: The right 
to adequate housing (art. 11 (1) of the Covenant), E/1992/23 (1 January 1992). 
6 United Nations, Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment no. 7: The right 
to adequate housing (art. 11 (1) of the Covenant): Forced evictions, E/1998/22 (20 May 1997). 
7 United Nations, Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Communication no. 5/2015, Ben 
Djazia and Bellili, E/C.12/61/D/5/2015 (21 July 2017). 
8 Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, López Albán, para. 6.2. 
9 Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment no. 7, para. 11.  
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to legislation which conforms to ICESCR standards and observing the principles of 
reasonableness and proportionality between the legitimate aim of evicting and the 
consequences thereof on the persons affected.10 
 
It recalled its decision in the Ben Djazia and Bellili case, where the Committee found 
that: 
 
In some circumstances, the eviction of people living in rental accommodation 
may be compatible with the Covenant, as long as the eviction is provided for 
by law and is carried out as a last resort, and that the persons concerned have 
had prior access to an effective judicial remedy, in order to ascertain that the 
measure in question is duly justified, for example, in the case of persistent 
non-payment of rent or of damage to rented property without just cause. In 
addition, there must be a real opportunity for genuine prior consultation 
between the authorities and the persons concerned, there must be no less 
onerous alternative means or measures available and the persons concerned 
must not remain in or be exposed to a situation constituting a violation of 
other Covenant or human rights.11 
 
The Committee then emphasised the importance of ensuring the right of family members 
not to be separated from each other, and the distinction between emergency shelter and 
housing. In certain circumstances, states can show that, despite making all efforts to the 
maximum of their available resources, it was impossible to offer alternative permanent 
housing to an evicted person in need of alternative accommodation. In these cases, it is 
possible to resort to temporary emergency shelter, which needs not fulfil all requirements 
of adequate housing. Nonetheless, states must ensure that temporary shelter is compatible 
with the protection of human dignity, that it fulfils all safety requirements, and that it does 
not become a permanent solution but rather a temporary step towards stable and adequate 
housing.12 
 
The CESCR acknowledged that states can take measures to protect private property and 
to avoid the illegal, mala fide occupation of buildings. They can also legitimately establish 
certain conditions that applicants must fulfil in order to obtain social benefits, including 
housing. However, these conditions must be reasonable and must be carefully designed 
to avoid stigmatisation: a person’s behaviour cannot in itself become a justification for 
the state’s refusal to provide public or social housing.13 Judicial and administrative 
authorities must not perpetuate systemic discrimination against persons living in poverty 
who occupy a dwelling without an appropriate legal title, both when they are bona fide 
occupants and when they occupy out of necessity. Moreover, since growing inequality 
                                                 
10 Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, López Albán, para. 8.2. 
11 Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Ben Djazia and Bellili, para. 15.1; Committee on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, López Albán, para. 8.3. 
12 López Albán, para. 9.4. 
13 López Albán, para. 10.1. 
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and speculation in housing markets are at the root of the lack of sufficient affordable 
housing, states must address these structural causes by means of an adequate and 
coordinated approach, to the maximum of their available resources.14 
 
The Committee noted that the author was found guilty of trespassing and that this is a 
legitimate ground that can in principle justify the author’s eviction. However, the court 
ordering the eviction did not carry out a proportionality assessment between the legitimate 
aim of evicting a person guilty of trespassing and the consequences of this eviction for 
those involved. Whereas the legitimate interest of the owner in recovering possession of 
their property must be considered: 
 
It is inevitable to make a distinction between individuals who require their 
property to use it as housing or to secure a vital income, on the one hand, and 
financial entities who own property, on the other hand, as in the current case. 
A finding that an eviction is not a reasonable measure in a particular moment 
does not necessarily mean that an eviction order cannot be made against the 
occupants at all. Nonetheless, the principles of reasonability and 
proportionality may require that this order be suspended or postponed to 
avoid the possibility that the evicted persons become destitute or that other 
Covenant rights are violated. An eviction order can also be made dependent 
on other factors, such as requiring public authorities to intervene and assist 
occupants in order to mitigate the consequences of an eviction.15 
 
The Committee then went on to affirm that: 
 
The state party must develop a normative framework regulating evictions of 
persons occupying property without a legal title, when this property 
constitutes their home. This framework must stipulate the criteria that judicial 
authorities must consider when evaluating whether to make an eviction order 
under those circumstances: for instance, whether the person occupied the 
dwelling bona fide or not, the personal circumstances of the occupants and 
their dependants, and whether they cooperated with the authorities in the 
search for solutions adapted to them. Nevertheless, a state party will violate 
the right to adequate housing if it stipulates that a person occupying a dwelling 
without a legal title must be immediately evicted, regardless of the 
circumstances under which the eviction order would be executed.16 
 
The Committee thus found a violation of the author’s (and her children’s) right to housing 
on this count. 
 
                                                 
14 López Albán, para. 10.2. 
15 López Albán, para. 11.5. 
16 López Albán, para. 11.7. 
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The Committee subsequently noted that the author had tried to remedy her situation by 
applying for public housing, but her application was rejected due to the requirement that 
applicants do not occupy a dwelling without an appropriate legal title or without the 
owner’s consent. For the Committee, this requirement put the author in an impossible 
situation, forcing her to either live with her children in temporary shared accommodation 
or to live in destitution before she could apply for public housing. This entailed a second 
violation of the author’s (and her children’s) right to adequate housing, since that 
requirement perpetuated her irregular situation and led her to an eviction, without regard 
to her situation of necessity.17 
 
Finally, the Committee found a third violation, this time of the Optional Protocol to the 
ICESCR, due to the fact that Spain had not complied with the interim measures requested 
by the Committee during its examination of the case. Although the state had provided the 
author with temporary emergency shelter, this did not constitute adequate alternative 
accommodation.18 
 
In light of these violations, the Committee made a series of individual and general 
recommendations. With regard to the author and her children, Spain must provide them 
with an effective reparation, which includes a series of elements. If they do not yet have 
adequate housing, their needs and their priority in the waiting list must be reevaluated 
with the aim to provide them with public housing or to take other measures to secure 
adequate housing for them. Spain must also compensate them economically for the 
human right violations they suffered, and carry with all legal costs for the procedure 
before the CESCR. 
 
Regarding the general recommendations, Spain must develop a normative framework 
regulating evictions which allows judicial authorities to carry out a proportionality 
assessment having regard to the aim pursued by the eviction measure and its 
consequences on the evicted persons, as well as the compatibility of that measure with 
the ICESCR. This should apply to all eviction cases, including those of occupation 
without a legal title. Spain should also ensure that appropriate and effective remedies are 
available in this context. Access to public or social housing must not be made conditional 
on any unreasonable requirements excluding persons at risk of destitution, including the 
requirement in question that applicants not occupy a dwelling without a legal title.  
 
In addition, Spain must adopt the necessary measures to ensure that evictions affecting 
persons without sufficient resources to find alternative housing for themselves are only 
carried out after a genuine and effective consultation with them. The state must take all 
necessary steps to the maximum of its available resources to provide evicted persons with 
alternative housing, in particular where families, elderly people, children, or other persons 
in a vulnerable situation are involved. Finally, Spain must elaborate and implement a 
                                                 
17 López Albán, para. 12.1–12.2. 
18 López Albán, para. 13.1–13.3. 
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comprehensive and integral plan to guarantee the right to housing of low-income persons, 
and must establish a protocol to ensure that the interim measures requested by the CESCR 
in the framework of the individual complaints mechanism are effectively implemented. 
 
4. Commentary. 
4.1. A strong protection for tenants against eviction: The obligation for courts to 
conduct a proportionality assessment. 
The CESCR decision in López Albán follows the doctrinal line established in the Ben 
Djazia and Bellili case and in previous CESCR General Comments. It confirms that the 
protection afforded by the ICESCR against forced evictions also applies to persons 
occupying dwellings without a legal title, be they bona fide or out-of-necessity occupants. 
While the private property interests of owners (in particular their right to recover 
possession) must be taken into account during an eviction procedure, courts must also 
carefully assess the specific situation of the persons affected before making an eviction 
order. The granularity in which the Committee spells out the factors that courts ought to 
take into account in this context is particularly noteworthy. As mentioned above, this 
includes the presence or not of bona fide, the personal circumstances of the occupants and 
their dependants, and their cooperation with the authorities in the search for adapted 
solutions. 
 
Crucially, the state must develop a normative framework regulating evictions that takes 
account of these factors and allows courts to make proportionality assessments on this 
basis in all evictions cases—not just those of occupation without a legal title. It is now 
clear that the immediate eviction of a person occupying a dwelling, with or without a 
legal title, regardless of their circumstances breaches the ICESCR. This finding casts 
serious doubts about the compatibility with international human rights law of the existing 
Spanish legal framework, where a 2018 Act allowing for the immediate eviction of 
squatters through a summary procedure with no safeguards for the persons involved was 
recently declared constitutional by the Constitutional Court.19 In light of the CESCR 
decision in López Albán, Spain ought to repeal or amend this particular Act, as well as a 
sizeable part of the domestic framework governing evictions as a whole. 
 
Furthermore, the decision in López Albán clarifies that the domestic judicial ruling need 
not be a binary one of evicting or not evicting, but rather courts should consider the 
possibility of suspending or postponing the eviction or of making it conditional on the 
effective intervention of social services. A postponement, along with the intervention of 
social services or help with negotiations with the landlord, could contribute to a solution 
in some cases. Of course, this requires a strong and active role for social services, notably 
                                                 
19 Spain, Ley 5/2018, de 11 de junio, de modificación de la Ley 1/2000, de 7 de enero, de Enjuiciamiento 
Civil, en relación a la ocupación ilegal de viviendas (BOE núm. 142, de 12 de junio de 2018); Spain, 
Tribunal Constitucional (Pleno), Sentencia 32/2019, de 28 de febrero de 2019 (BOE núm. 73, de 26 de 
marzo de 2019). See further Juan Carlos Benito Sánchez, “Los pronunciamientos del Comité DESC sobre 
derecho a la vivienda relativos a España. Respuestas jurisprudenciales y legislativas,” Lex Social, Revista 
de Derechos Sociales 9, no. 2 (2019): 579–603. 
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by improving their ability to act and, importantly, by enlarging the stock of public housing 
units available as alternative accommodation for individuals and families at risk of 
eviction. 
 
The Committee also makes a distinction between small and large owners, distinguishing 
the situation where an individual depends on the rental income of a second property to 
subsist, on the one hand, from the situation of rentier landlords, investors, and financial 
entities, on the other hand. The question whether this distinction is relevant or useful in 
this context is an important one. Although this is clearly an element that should bear some 
weight, it should not be used to downgrade the protection afforded to tenants renting from 
small owners, as this comprises the majority of cases in most countries including Spain.20 
In line with the previous remark, it seems that this factor could be more relevant at the 
stage of determining whether—and if so, for how long—the eviction could be suspended 
or postponed, rather than at the stage of determining whether to make an eviction order 
as a matter of principle, where the circumstances of the individuals and families affected 
should prevail. 
 
Another significant point is the distinction made by the CESCR between emergency 
shelter and adequate housing. Emergency shelter must be temporary, must respect the 
dignity and safety of its occupants, and must constitute a temporary step towards stable 
and adequate housing. This undermines the argument often made by states that relocating 
evicted families into hostels exhausts their obligations as to the provision of adequate 
alternative accommodation. This case showed how this is problematic in many ways. The 
family went to three hostels: a first one for a few days, a second one were they had to 
share a room with another family and where one of the children was attacked, and a third 
one where the seven-year old male twins were separated from their mother and sisters. It 
is now clear that the obligation to provide adequate alternative accommodation is not 
discharged simply by making such provisional arrangements. Moreover, even provisional 
arrangements must fully respect ICESCR standards of dignity and safety. 
 
The Committee treads carefully when qualifying the author’s situation. While some might 
frame it as a case of “illegal occupation” or of squatting, this case is ultimately about a 
single mother with six children who was initially deceived into renting an apartment from 
a person who was not the real owner, who then stayed in the apartment out of necessity 
and who diligently (albeit unsuccessfully) applied for public housing in the meantime. 
The draconian condition established by the Madrid regional authorities to the effect of 
rejecting all applicants who were occupying without a legal title put her in an 
unconscionable situation, where her choices were either squatting or homelessness. It is 
now also clear that such a requirement is not compliant with international human rights 
law. 
 
                                                 
20 It is estimated that 95% of landlords in the private rental sector in Spain are small owners. See Spain, La 
vivienda protegida y el alquiler social en España (Madrid: Defensor del Pueblo, 2019), 16, 
https://www.defensordelpueblo.es/wp-content/uploads/2019/07/Separata_vivienda_protegida.pdf. 
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Finally, the violation of the Optional Protocol as a consequence of the non-compliance 
with the interim measures requested by the Committee comes in the midst of a legal 
debate in Spain regarding the binding character of decisions taken by human rights treaty-
monitoring bodies and whether interim measures requested by these bodies are 
compulsory or not under the domestic legal order.21 Spain has not complied with interim 
measures in other cases pending before the CESCR. Since there is now an explicit 
recommendation for Spain to create a protocol ensuring this compliance, it remains to be 
seen whether the state will change its stance on this question and will begin to 
systematically implement all interim measures requested by the CESCR. A currently 
pending case before the Committee involving Belgium, where an interim measure was 
similarly not implemented, is likely to shine more light in this regard.22 
 
4.2. The contrasting approach of the European Court of Human Rights. 
The CESCR interpretation of Article 11 ICESCR set out above stands in stark contrast 
with the far more restrictive position taken by the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECtHR) with regard to Article 8 of the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR), 
which protects the right to private and family life and the right to home. Although the 
material scope of these two articles is certainly very different, it is important to raise 
attention as to how these divergent interpretations may pose problems for Council of 
Europe states.23  
 
Notably, the ECtHR has recently ruled that, in the private rental sector, states can legislate 
to preemptively determine the balance between the right to property of owners and the 
right to housing of occupants, without their being required to allow courts to conduct a 
proportionality assessment in particular cases before making an eviction order. The 
ECtHR case law in this regard can be briefly summarised as follows.24  
                                                 
21 See Alberto Macho Carro, “La naturaleza jurídica del Comité de derechos económicos, sociales y 
culturales de Naciones Unidas y de sus pronunciamientos. Especial atención al caso español,” Papeles El 
tiempo de los derechos (HURIAGE – Red Tiempo de los derechos, 2019), 
https://redtiempodelosderechos.files.wordpress.com/2019/01/desc-12-19.pdf. 
22 See Tom Denis, “La Ligue des droits de l’Homme s’indigne contre l’expulsion d’un locataire à 
Etterbeek,” RTBF, October 19, 2018, https://www.rtbf.be/info/regions/detail_la-ligue-des-droits-de-l-
homme-s-indigne-contre-l-expulsion-d-un-locataire-a-etterbeek?id=10051153. 
23 See further Jessie Hohmann, The Right to Housing: Law, Concepts, Possibilities (Oxford: Hart 
Publishing, 2013). For an overview of the protection against evictions in human rights law, including at the 
ECHR level, see Padraic Kenna, “Introduction,” in Loss of Homes and Evictions across Europe: A 
Comparative Legal and Policy Examination, ed. Padraic Kenna et al., Elgar Land and Housing Law and 
Policy (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2018), 1–65. 
24 I have selected the most relevant cases for this section. For a more complete picture, see European Court 
of Human Rights, Guide on Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights: Right to respect for 
private and family life, home and correspondence,  
https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Guide_Art_8_ENG.pdf, p. 78–80. See also Sarah Fick and Michel 
Vols, “Best Protection Against Eviction? A Comparative Analysis of Protection Against Evictions in the 
European Convention on Human Rights and the South African Constitution,” European Journal of 
Comparative Law and Governance 3 (2016): 40–69; Nicolas Bernard, “La protection conventionnelle du 
domicile tombe-t-elle lorsqu’on l’invoque contre un particulier ? La longue quête de l’horizontalisation des 
droits de l’homme (obs. sous Cour eur. dr. h., décision F.J.M. c. Royaume-Uni, 6 novembre 2018),” Revue 
trimestrielle des droits de l’homme 2019, no. 120 (2019): 891–923. 




In the 2004 case of Connors,25 the Court initially ruled that a notice of eviction issued by 
a local authority in the case of Travellers halting at a public residential site must be 
necessary and comply with all procedural guarantees as part of a fair decision-making 
process before an independent court. This concerned, however, a site owned and managed 
by a public local authority.26 
 
Later on, in the 2008 case of McCann,27 concerning the eviction of a woman victim of 
gender-based violence residing in public housing, the Court resoundingly stated that “the 
loss of one’s home is a most extreme form of interference with the right to respect for the 
home. Any person at risk of an interference of this magnitude should in principle be able 
to have the proportionality of the measure determined by an independent tribunal in the 
light of the relevant principles under Article 8 of the Convention, notwithstanding that, 
under domestic law, his right of occupation has come to an end.”28 At the same time, the 
Court conceded that this principle would only apply in exceptional cases, and rejected the 
argument that a proportionality assessment would have serious consequences for the 
functioning of the system: “in the great majority of cases, an order for possession could 
continue to be made in summary proceedings.”29 It is important to highlight that the 
landlord in this case was again a public local authority. 
 
In the 2012 case of Yordanova,30 the Court then considered that several Roma families 
which had been living for decades on publicly owned land without a legal title and were 
threatened with eviction had the right to have the proportionality of this measure 
examined by an independent court before the eviction was carried out. The state had de 
facto tolerated the settlement over a long period of time, and the residents had at that point 
developed strong and long-standing links with one another. For the Court, this situation 
was to be treated “as being entirely different from routine cases of removal of an 
                                                 
25 European Court of Human Rights, First Section, Connors v. the United Kingdom, Application no. 
66746/01 (27 May 2004). 
26 The term “Travellers” refers to a broad segment of the population characterised by a cultural connection 
to a nomadic or a semi-nomadic lifestyle. They usually live in mobile homes rather than “bricks and mortar” 
housing, and they require residential or transit sites with appropriate amenities to be made available in order 
to secure their right to adequate housing. The Traveller population is numerically significant in countries 
like Belgium, France, the United Kingdom, or Ireland, but not that much in countries like Spain. See further 
Elena Marushiakova and Vesselin Popov, “Who Are Roma?,” in Roma Culture: Myths and Realities, ed. 
Elena Marushiakova and Vesselin Popov, Roma Series, Vol. 3 (Munich: Lincom Academic Publisher, 
2016); Céline Romainville and Nicolas Bernard, “Le droit à l’habitat des gens du voyage,” in Le droit et la 
diversité culturelle, ed. Julie Ringelheim, Collection du Centre des droits de l’homme de l’Université 
catholique de Louvain (Brussels: Bruylant, 2011), 745–818. 
27 European Court of Human Rights, Fourth Section, McCann v. the United Kingdom, Application no. 
19009/04 (13 May 2008). 
28 European Court of Human Rights, McCann v. the United Kingdom, para. 50. 
29 European Court of Human Rights, McCann v. the United Kingdom, para. 54. 
30 European Court of Human Rights, Fourth Section, Yordanova and Others v. Bulgaria, Application no. 
25446/06 (24 April 2012). 
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individual from unlawfully occupied property.”31 In this case, the land once again 
belonged to a public authority.32 
 
In the 2013 case of Winterstein,33 concerning Travellers in a similar situation to the 
applicants in Yordanova, the Court followed the same reasoning, even though the land in 
this case was private—some residents were owners, while other were tenants. The court 
highlighted that the state had de facto tolerated over decades this long-standing 
community, whose members had developed strong ties with one another, and found that 
an eviction according to legislation which did not allow for a prior proportionality 
assessment by a court would breach Art. 8 ECHR.34 
 
It is thus clear that, under the ECtHR’s interpretation of Article 8 ECHR, an eviction 
procedure which does not foresee the possibility to have the proportionality of the eviction 
examined by an independent court breaches this article where: (a) public or social housing 
is concerned; or (b) where the state has de facto tolerated residents over a long period of 
time and these residents have formed strong, long-standing bonds with one another, 
regardless of whether the land they are occupying is public or private. 
 
The situation drastically changes, however, with regard to the private rented sector. In the 
2016 case of Vrzić,35 the Court ruled that where the landlord is a private individual or 
body the aforementioned principle does not apply automatically. In previous cases, “the 
applicants were living in State-owned or socially-owned flats and an important aspect of 
finding a violation was the fact that there was no other private interest at stake.”36  
 
This trend was confirmed in the 2018 case of F.J.M.,37 where the Court confirmed that 
the UK could legitimately adopt legislation determining the balance between the rights 
of private landlords and the rights of tenants, so that a procedure for eviction which does 
not foresee the possibility for courts to carry out a proportionality assessment before 
making an eviction order does not breach Article 8 ECHR. Since, in this case, the tenant 
had agreed to the terms of the contract, requiring courts to conduct a proportionality 
                                                 
31 European Court of Human Rights, Yordanova and Others v. Bulgaria, para. 121. 
32 Another important factor for the ECtHR in this case was the Roma ethnicity of the applicants. For the 
Court, “the applicants’ situation as an outcast community and one of the socially disadvantaged groups” 
must be acknowledged, as “such social groups, regardless of the ethnic origin of their members, may need 
assistance in order to be able effectively to enjoy the same rights as the majority population.” (European 
Court of Human Rights, Yordanova and Others v. Bulgaria, para. 129). 
33 European Court of Human Rights, Fifth Section, Winterstein and Others v. France, Application no. 
27013/07 (17 October 2013). 
34 See also European Court of Human Rights, Third Section, Bagdonavicius and Others v. Russia, 
Application no. 19841/06 (11 October 2016). 
35 European Court of Human Rights, Second Section, Vrzić v. Croatia, Application no. 43777/13 (12 July 
2016). 
36 European Court of Human Rights, Vrzić v. Croatia, para. 66. 
37 European Court of Human Rights, First Section, F.J.M. v. the United Kingdom, Application no. 76202/16 
(6 November 2018). 
ISSN: 2174-6419                                                                                       Lex Social, vol. 10, núm. 1 (2020) 
 
376 
assessment before making an eviction order would lead to a “wholly unpredictable and 
potentially very damaging” impact on the private rented sector.38 
 
This means that, under the ECtHR’s interpretation of Article 8 ECHR, an eviction 
procedure which does not foresee the possibility to have the proportionality of the eviction 
examined by an independent court does not breach this article when private rental housing 
is concerned, unless the state has de facto tolerated residents over a long period of time 
and these residents have formed strong, long-standing bonds with one another.39 
 
By contrast to this, the CESCR’s position in López Albán and in Ben Djazia and Bellili 
confirms that, under international human rights law, courts ought to be able to consider 
the proportionality of evictions in the private rented sector, even in cases of occupation 
without a legal title.40 Moreover, the state should incorporate this into its domestic 
legislation, specifying the factors that courts ought to take into account when considering 
the proportionality of the eviction, such as personal circumstances, the existence or not 
of bona fide, and the extent of their cooperation with the authorities. 
 
This fragmentation and lack of consistency are likely to weaken legal claims put before 
courts by persons at risk of being evicted. This may ultimately allow states to disregard 
the full extent of their human rights obligations by shielding themselves behind concepts 
like bindingness, enforceability, and hierarchy between different human rights 
instruments. This can be currently seen in Spain, where the response to the Ben Djazia 
and Bellili case has been lukewarm and where requests for interim measures made by the 
CESCR are not always complied with by domestic courts.41 At the same time, the 
expansive interpretation developed by the CESCR is likely to open up new possibilities 
in the realm of social and political contestation, pushing for legislative change that brings 
the protection afforded to the right to housing in Spain within these parameters.42 
                                                 
38 European Court of Human Rights, F.J.M. v. the United Kingdom, para. 43. 
39 Some doubts remain as to whether the key factor here is the ownership of the dwelling in question (public, 
social, or private) or the fact that the applicant entered into a contractual relationship with the owner. In 
Vrzić, the Court noted that “the applicants had not signed any form of agreement whereby they risked losing 
their home” (European Court of Human Rights, Vrzić v. Croatia, para. 66). In F.J.M., it found that “what 
sets claims for possession by private sector owners against residential occupiers apart is that the two private 
individuals or entities have entered voluntarily into a contractual relationship in respect of which the 
legislature has prescribed how their respective Convention rights are to be respected” (European Court of 
Human Rights, F.J.M. v. the United Kingdom, para. 42). More clarity from the Court in this sense would 
be welcome in future judgments; however, the outcome does not seem to differ much in substance 
40 Even though the ECtHR required a proportionality assessment in a case of occupation without legal title, 
it later clarified that this finding was made in the specific context of the former Yugoslavia, where a publicly 
owned hotel group paid obligatory monthly contributions into a housing fund and was later privatised. See 
European Court of Human Rights, F.J.M. v. the United Kingdom, para. 38; European Court of Human 
Rights, First Section, Brežec v. Croatia, Application no. 7177/10 (18 July 2013). 
41 See further Benito Sánchez, “Los pronunciamientos del Comité DESC sobre derecho a la vivienda 
relativos a España.” 
42 These guarantees against forced eviction become crucial in today’s phase of late capitalism, where public 
and social housing systems across the world are being eroded in favour of the private rented sector and of 
a homeownership model combined with a value extraction, buy-to-let logic. See David Madden and Peter 
Marcuse, In Defense of Housing: The Politics of Crisis (London: Verso, 2016); Josh Ryan-Collins et al., 
Rethinking the Economics of Land and Housing (London: Zed, 2017). 
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4.3. What comes next? Two possible future legal avenues for the CESCR to explore. 
Before concluding this article, I would like to briefly set out some ideas as to what to 
expect next, and to highlight two legal avenues which could benefit from further 
development by the CESCR. Since the vast majority of pending cases before the 
Committee concern the right to housing in Spain, my suggestions here focus on the 
Spanish context, although many of them can be easily extrapolated to other national 
contexts. 
 
Firstly, according to the CESCR website, there are currently more than a hundred pending 
cases against Spain concerning the right to housing.43 This reveals a structural problem 
which should be addressed in a structural manner. Whereas the individual complaints 
mechanism is highly effective in dealing with more or less isolated human rights 
violations, it is not well suited to this type of structural, widespread violations. The 
CESCR could emphasise this structural dimension by conducting a “pilot” procedure, 
inspiring itself from other international and regional instances such as the ECtHR. In this 
manner, and taking into account the difference in nature between institutions: 
 
Besides finding an individual violation . . . a “full” pilot judgment consists of 
the following steps: first, identifying a systematic malfunctioning of domestic 
legislation or administrative practice; second, concluding that this systematic 
problem may give rise to numerous subsequent well‐ founded applications; 
third, recognizing that general measures are called for and suggesting the 
form such general measures may take in order to remedy the systematic 
defect; and fourth, adjourning all other pending individual applications 
deriving from the same systematic defect.44 
 
It is true that the individual complaint procedure already allows for the Committee to 
make recommendations with a general scope, and that the Committee has not shied away 
from doing so, often in very straightforward terms. However, the individual manner in 
which complaints are currently approached by the Committee places a natural limit on 
the recognition of structural problems, which end up being reduced to and coached in the 
narrower terms of specific individual complaints.  
 
Although the Optional Protocol providing for this system of individual complaints does 
not explicitly foresee the possibility of a pilot procedure, it does not seem to preclude it 
either, as long as the Committee ultimately adopts views on communications “submitted 
by or on behalf of individuals or groups of individuals, under the jurisdiction of a State 
                                                 
43 The list of pending cases is available at: 
https://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/CESCR/Pages/PendingCases.aspx. 
44 Markus Fyrnys, “Expanding Competences by Judicial Lawmaking: The Pilot Judgment Procedure of the 
European Court of Human Rights,” German Law Journal 12, no. 5 (2011): 1232–33; Luzius Wildhaber, 
“Pilot Judgments in Cases of Structural or Systemic Problems on the National Level,” in The European 
Court of Human Rights Overwhelmed by Applications: Problems and Possible Solutions, ed. Ulrike 
Deutsch and Rüdiger Wolfrum, Beiträge zum ausländischen öffentlichen Recht und Völkerrecht 205 
(Berlin: Springer, 2009), 71. 
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Party, claiming to be victims of a violation of any of the economic, social and cultural 
rights set forth in the Covenant by that State Party.”45  
 
This would allow the CESCR to focus more effectively on structural and systemic failures 
breaching human rights, notably with regard to the right to adequate housing in Spain and 
the domestic legal framework governing evictions. Dealing with a few dozen of very 
similar cases as a whole would send a very powerful message to Spain and the 
international community as to the extent of these human rights violations and their 
collective dimension, going beyond the force of CESCR concluding observations in the 
framework of the periodic reporting procedure while remaining at the same time within 
the bounds of the individual complaint mechanism. 
 
Secondly, the Committee made a strong statement in López Albán regarding the role of 
growing inequality and housing market speculation in the housing affordability crisis, 
linking this to stigmatisation and systemic discrimination on the basis of socioeconomic 
disadvantage. This is of particular relevance, as it links to broader trends in international 
human rights and antidiscrimination law recognising the centrality of socioeconomic 
disadvantage and of intersectional discrimination within many human rights violations. 
The draft guidelines for the implementation of the right to adequate housing recently 
elaborated by the UN Special Rapporteur on adequate housing as a component of the right 
to an adequate standard of living, and on the right to non-discrimination in this context, 
Ms. Leilani Farha, notably emphasise this dimension.46 
 
In this sense, one of the key issues that has not explicitly emerged in the cases decided 
until now is the equality and nondiscrimination dimension of most of these violations, 
including from a socioeconomic perspective.47 It can be recalled that in 2018, in its 
Concluding observations on the sixth periodic report of Spain, the CESCR urged Spain 
to: 
 
                                                 
45 United Nations, Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights, art. 2. 
46 In their draft version of November 2019, these guidelines state that : “Refugees, migrants, persons with 
disabilities, children and youth, indigenous peoples, women, LGBT and racial and ethnic minorities are 
disproportionately represented among those living in homelessness, informality and inadequate housing, 
and often relegated to the most marginal and unsafe areas to live. Discrimination against these groups is 
compounded by intersectional discrimination linked to their housing status: being homeless, living in 
informality or in neighbourhoods with a high percentage of inadequate or dilapidated housing. 
Discriminatory exclusion from housing greatly exacerbates and reinforces socio-economic inequality for 
these groups.”  
See further at: https://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Housing/Pages/GuidelinesImplementation.aspx. 
47 See, on the issue of socioeconomic disadvantage in the context of housing, Juan Carlos Benito Sánchez, 
“Towering Grenfell: Reflections around Socioeconomic Disadvantage in Antidiscrimination Law,” Queen 
Mary Human Rights Law Review 5, no. 2 (2019). See also more generally Diane Roman, “La discrimination 
fondée sur la condition sociale, une catégorie manquante du droit français,” Recueil Dalloz, no. 28 (2013): 
1911–1918; Ioannis Rodopoulos, “L’absence de la précarité sociale parmi les motifs de discrimination 
reconnus par le droit français : un frein normatif à l’effectivité de la lutte contre les discriminations ?,” La 
Revue des droits de l’homme 9 (2016); Margaret Thornton, “Social Status: The Last Bastion of 
Discrimination,” Anti-Discrimination Law Review 2018, no. 1 (2018): 5–26. 
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Adopt a comprehensive law on non-discrimination that guarantees adequate 
protection and explicitly includes all the prohibited grounds for 
discrimination referred to in article 2 (2) of the Covenant; defines multiple 
discrimination, as well as direct and indirect discrimination, in accordance 
with the State party’s obligations under the Covenant; prohibits 
discrimination in both the public and the private spheres; and incorporates 
provisions under which redress can be obtained in cases of discrimination, 
including by judicial and administrative means. It also recommends that the 
State party redouble its efforts to prevent and combat persistent 
discrimination, in particular against Gitanos and Roma, persons with 
disabilities, migrants, refugees and asylum seekers, including by conducting 
awareness-raising campaigns, in order to guarantee full exercise of the rights 
recognized in the Covenant by such persons.48 
 
In future decisions on individual complaints, the Committee should more clearly 
acknowledge how the existing framework governing evictions in Spain 
disproportionately impacts on certain vulnerable groups, and may create indirect 
discrimination on the basis of racial or ethnic origin, gender, disability, age, migrant 
status, and economic and social situation. In many cases, most of these factors interact 
with each other to create intersectional discrimination, notion which should also bear 
some weight in future CESCR decisions. 49 Although discrimination issues have perhaps 
not been yet sufficiently raised in individual complaints, possibly owing to the weak 
antidiscrimination law framework existing in Spain and to a domestic judicial praxis 
where arguments based on antidiscrimination law have a narrow chance of succeeding, 
this is a crucial dimension that needs to be highlighted from a human rights standpoint.  
 
Once again, taking a step from a more general statement in concluding observations to a 
more localised and contextual finding in the framework of an individual complaint would 
make these underpinning issues more visible and enhance the relevance of the equality 
and nondiscrimination dimension of economic, social, and cultural rights. It can be 
recalled in this sense that the CESCR noted in its General Comment No. 20 that 
“individuals and groups of individuals must not be arbitrarily treated on account of 
belonging to a certain economic or social group or strata within society. A person’s social 
and economic situation when living in poverty or being homeless may result in pervasive 
discrimination, stigmatization and negative stereotyping.”50 While the Committee has 
hinted towards this aspect in López Albán, a more robust approach would be welcome, 
especially in light of such structural threats to the right to adequate housing in Spain. 
                                                 
48 United Nations, Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Concluding observations on the 
sixth periodic report of Spain, E/C.12/ESP/CO/6 (25 April 2018), para. 18. 
49 See, on the issue of discrimination in the field of housing, Ringelheim, Julie, and Nicolas Bernard. 
Discrimination in Housing. Luxembourg: European Network of Legal Experts in the Non-Discrimination 
Field, 2013. https://www.equalitylaw.eu/downloads/1337-discrimination-in-housing-en. 
50 United Nations, Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment no. 20: Non-
discrimination in economic, social and cultural rights (art. 2, para. 2, of the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights), E/C.12/GC/20 (2 July 2009), para. 35. 




The CESCR decision in López Albán follows the doctrinal line established in the Ben 
Djazia and Bellili case and in previous CESCR General Comments. It confirms that the 
protection afforded by the ICESCR against forced evictions also applies to persons 
occupying dwellings without a legal title, be they bona fide or out-of-necessity occupants. 
At the same time, it provides a number of new and important legal insights and 
clarifications, such as the difference between emergency shelter and adequate housing, 
the fact that the state cannot allow for the immediate eviction of a person regardless of 
the circumstances, or examples of the factors that courts ought to take into account when 
conducting a proportionality assessment. This expansive interpretation of the safeguards 
surrounding the right to housing stands in stark contrast with the increasingly more 
restrictive case law of the European Court of Human Rights. Two possible legal avenues 
for the CESCR to explore in future decisions could be resorting to a “pilot” procedure 
that reflects the structural and systemic character of the violations of the right to housing 
taking place in Spain, on the one hand, and acknowledging the discriminatory impact of 
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